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From Defending Theism
to Discerning Spirits:
Reconceiving the Task of
Christian Philosophy

ourselves and the world and God” (18). In this
paper I will argue that philosophy is not only
an arena in which these deep commitments play
out and are systematically clarified but also a key
method by which those commitments are brought
to intellectual light in the first place. In this regard,
philosophy is not just about examining and understanding theistic beliefs and their relation to our
other thoughts and actions; rather, it is the means
by which we discern the spirits of our time.

by Neal DeRoo
In his “Advice to Christian Philosophers”1 Alvin Plantinga lays out two pressing tasks for philosophy: systematizing, deepening, and clarifying
Christian thought on key philosophical topics
(16) and exploring how the result of such clarification bears on the rest of what we think and do
(18). These tasks are necessary because philosophy
provides “an arena for the articulation and interplay of commitments and allegiances fundamentally religious in nature; it is an expression of deep
and fundamental perspectives, ways of viewing
Dr. Neal DeRoo is Associate Professor of Philosophy at
Dordt College, and Fellow of the Andreas Center for
Reformed Scholarship and Service.

Spirits of the Age?
If this recourse to spirits seems too mystical—or,
perhaps even worse, too Hegelian—to be included
in meaningful rational discourse, that is an issue
you will have to take up with Prof. Plantinga himself. For it is he who uses this language to describe
the urgency of the task of Christian philosophy:
“Most of the so-called human sciences, much of
the non-human sciences, most of non-scientific intellectual endeavor and even a good bit of allegedly
Christian theology is animated by a spirit wholly
foreign to that of Christian theism” (3; emphasis
added). It is highly unlikely that we are to think of
this animation by a spirit along the lines of supernatural possession, as if a distinct immaterial entity somehow occupies and controls the scientific
enterprise. But if it’s not Casper the un-friendly
ghost, then what are we dealing with here?
Generally, we tend to speak of a spirit of the age
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as analogous to a certain cultural mood, a felt disposition that leads in certain directions and away
from other directions. Hence, we can speak of the
“spirit of 1968” as a certain felt disposition, widespread during the late 1960s, toward free love and
away from power hierarchies and inter-personal
violence. If we work with this definition of spirit,
then a non-theistic spirit animating the scientific
enterprise would mean that there is a certain felt
disposition, widespread among participants in the
scientific enterprise, that moves those participants
away from theistic thoughts and conclusions.
And how would such a spirit become known
and articulated? Plantinga does not elaborate this
point, but he also claims that he doesn’t have to,
since “it is familiar to you all” (3). This sense of
familiarity is perhaps bred from the proximity of
philosophers to the environs in which this spirit is
wide-spread. Because the spirit is a felt disposition,
it is plausible to assume that those who live and
operate in the environs where that spirit is widely
spread would themselves feel that spirit, either directly or via its effects. But precisely because it is
a felt disposition, it is not clear how such a spirit
could have an impact on the theoretical commitments and presuppositions of those it affects. Even
more, if such a spirit is a felt disposition, how could
we speak of it as animating theology (or any other
theoretical discipline), which is clearly not capable
of being the subject of feelings or of possessing dispositions?
A Spirit-ual Anthropology
To better understand this notion of a spirit that
animates the scientific enterprise, I think we need
to clarify the philosophical anthropology with
which we are operating. In doing so, I will take
Professor Plantinga’s advice and offer a distinctly
Christian anthropology that is fully committed to
the belief that humanity has been created in the
image of God (12). In this view we will come to
see a slightly different account of spirits at work,
one that will open up for us a new (or at least clarified) task for Christian philosophy.
This account of anthropology begins with the
assumption of a radical distinction between Creator and creature, such that the latter can never
be a miniaturized version of the former. As such,
2
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humanity is not an image-bearer in the sense of
exhibiting a similar property in a similar way to
God.2 Indeed, being an image-bearer of God is not
a property of humanity at all but is rather its essential definition: humanity is image-bearing-ness
itself and not merely a thing that happens, accidentally, to bear the image of God. That is to say,
bearing God’s image to creation is not a part of
human activity, but it is, in fact, the totality of it:
everything that humanity does bears the imprint
of the God who created it—or the image of something else functioning as if it were God.
An anthropology that seeks to systematize this
understanding of humanity as image-bearers was
sketched out by Herman Dooyeweerd and elaborated by some of his followers (notably James H.
Olthuis3). Central to this anthropology is the notion of the heart as the spiritual center and integral
whole of humankind, the center from which the
entirety of human living flows. A key metaphor
in understanding this notion of the heart is that
of light shining through a prism: just as light is a
solid beam of white light on one side of the prism
but is refracted into the many colors of the rainbow on the other side of the prism, so too, the
heart is like a prism through which the creative
spirit of God shines and is refracted, in temporal
(creaturely) life, as all the various types of creaturely inter-action. On one side of the heart is the
unrefracted spirit of God, and on the other (temporal) side of the heart are the multiple aspects of
human existence, which are nothing but the spirit
of God refracted and expressed in particular temporal circumstances. The heart is therefore not a
part of the human being, but it is rather the essential condition of humanity: we do not have a
heart: we are heart-ed. As heart-ed creatures, we
cannot help but reflect some type of spirit in all
that we do, since it is our very natures to do so. All
of human action is a refraction of the spirit flowing
through our hearts.
On this anthropology, humanity is essentially
spiritual, insofar as everything we do is a refraction
of the spirit flowing through the human heart. This
spirit is picked up from, and is expressed within,
creation. Because the spirit is expressed through
every human action, other creatures can pick up
that spirit from human actions. Human action

functions as a transmitter that spreads that spirit to
other creatures. As creatures ourselves, we humans
also receive the spirit expressed in the work of other humans; because we are uniquely image-bearing
creatures, all human action is driven and animated
by a spirit of this type. Through all of our actions,
then, humans not only express the spirit that is at
work in their heart but also receive the spirit that is
to be expressed. Other people’s expressions of the
spirit become the fodder for our own expressions
of the spirit, and vice versa. The spirit is therefore

Indeed, being an image-bearer
of God is not a property of
humanity at all but is rather its
essential definition: humanity is
image-bearing-ness itself and not
merely a thing that happens,
accidentally, to bear the image
of God.
an essentially communal endeavor, insofar as it is
received and expressed in the interaction among
human beings.
This communal spirit is therefore an affective
force which may or may not be a distinct entity. As
an affective force, it drives (or animates) a course
of human action but is not expressed solely in one
or another element of human living. Rather, the
spiritual driving force is expressed in all the colors
of the rainbow,4 each of which is a distinct color
that yet remains necessarily integrally connected
to the other colors (since they are all expressions
of one and the same beam of light). Any act of
theoretical thought, then, is an action that betrays
multiple modes of relating (logical, historical/formative, linguistic, social, etc.), each of which is expressive of the spirit that animates the community
producing that scholarship. As such, no theoretical thought is spiritually neutral; instead, all theoretical thought is, by dint of being the product of
human action, essentially expressive of a spiritual
force that drives it.

Discerning the Spirit(s)
This anthropology has the virtue (at least in this
gathering) of lending credence to Professor Plantinga’s claims that Christian philosophers need be
no more apologetic of their own spiritual starting
point than are philosophers whose work expresses
a different spirit (humanist, materialist, etc.), as
well as his claims that Christian philosophers are
responsible first to the Christian community and
only secondarily to the philosophical one. This anthropology also helps us understand more clearly
what it might mean for a spirit to animate human
actions and institutions (such as the scientific enterprise and/or the institution of academic theology). While its implications on this score might
raise some questions about certain elements of the
anthropology that Plantinga lays out in “Advice
to Christian Philosopers,” especially pertaining to
voluntaristic free will and agent causation, here I
will focus on what this anthropology tells us about
the relation between animating spirits and human
action and how it helps us re-think the task of
Christian philosophy.
We have already established that this anthropology suggests that all human actions are expressive of a spirit that is at work in the human
heart, the spiritual, integral core of human existence. This spirit is communal rather than individual—it is expressed in, and received from, human interaction with other creatures (especially
other humans). As the spirit is communal, certain
communities will have a consistent spiritual vision
vis-à-vis other communities, insofar as different
spirits are animating each.5 While these different
spirits will be expressed in different ways through
concrete human actions, there is no guarantee that
the spirits themselves are rationally or consciously
known to the people within the communities they
are animating. That is to say, because these spirits
work directly on the heart, they work on a register that is pre-rational (and pre- everything else,
too, for that matter) and so may work in a way
that is totally unavowed to those expressing that
spirit: While I cannot help but express the spirit
at work in the heart, there is no guarantee that I
realize I am doing so. And because these spirits are
so integral to human living, their influence is massive, whether we realize this or not. And because
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it is so massive, we might like the opportunity to
think more carefully about the spirits animating
us and our communities, both to determine what
spirits drive us and whether we are all right with
that spirit or not. What is required, then, is a way
of distilling (or discerning) from human actions
the spirit(s) that animate or propel those actions.
Indeed, such a discerning of spirits is a primary
religious and spiritual task, insofar as these spirits
determine the religious and spiritual direction of
a community.
I would like to argue here that philosophy has
a unique role to play in this discerning process.
Where each discipline is tasked with investigating
a particular aspect of creation (or, rather, is tasked
with investigating creation from the viewpoint of a
particular aspect: biological, linguistic, psychological, etc.), philosophy is tasked with investigating
the integrity of creation: how do the different aspects and different disciplines hang together? Philosophical conceptions of ontology, anthropology,
and epistemology deal with these larger questions
and so are in a unique position to determine the
larger forces operating within and upon multiple
disciplines, multiple aspects (though these conceptions themselves will bear the mark of the spirit
that animates them). In addition, the self-reflective, wisdom-seeking elements of philo-sophia, as
opposed to merely the more specialized, technical elements of academic philosophy, also move
in the direction of articulating the spiritual forces
that animate the human world. Something similar
to this impulse seems to already be on Professor
Plantinga’s radar when he describes philosophy
as an arena for the “articulation … of commitments…fundamentally religious in nature” (18).
What I am suggesting here is to take this definition
of philosophy a step further, as that which pertains
to the very driving forces of cultural life itself. Philosophy is not merely one arena, one discipline,
among many in which these spiritual forces can be
articulated (though it is certainly that, too), and
its articulations are not limited merely to rational
or theoretical claims, to ideas; rather, philosophy
is a unique tool in the discernment, articulation,
and elaboration of the spirits that animate human
endeavors, be they the spirit of God or the spirits
of the age. This particular philosophical task might
4
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be one that is apparent only to Christian philosophers (though I don’t think this is the case6), but
Professor Plantinga would be the first to concede
that that alone does not make it any less pressing a
philosophical problem. As Christian philosophers,
we need not let our conception of philosophy, its
tasks and problems, be defined by the broader
academy.
A Final Suggestion
Before I proceed further, let me offer a word of
caution: that I want to add discerning the spirits
of our age as a task of Christian philosophy does
not imply that I want to abandon the other tasks
of (Christian) philosophy laid out by Professor
Plantinga. There is still a need for philosophy to
be academically rigorous; to systematize, deepen,
and clarify Christian thought; and to explore how
the result of such clarification bears on the rest of
what we think and do (18). That is, even as it is
tasked with discerning the spirits of the age, philosophy must remain a theoretical and academic
venture. But the academic venture of philosophy
must, ultimately, be in the service of the pursuit of
the wisdom that requires a discerning of the spirits
that animate us, whether that be the spirit of God
(“The fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom”) or of something else. This is not to say that
all Christian philosophers must be so-called popularizers, but merely that the results of Christian
philosophizing ought to be helpful beyond merely
academic borders.
In that light, I would like to offer an exploratory hypothesis, a tentative suggestion: Christian
philosophy would benefit greatly from using the
resources of phenomenology in its pursuit of its
task. Phenomenology offers two distinct elements
of methodology that make it a beneficial addition to the Christian philosophical toolbox: first,
it elaborates the life-world, that is, the world of
everyday human experience, by recourse to the
promises already inherent in that life-world and so
takes that world on its own terms while further
clarifying, deepening, and understanding those
terms; and second, it uses both synthesis and analyticity in service of integrality, which again points
to its orientation to the world of everyday human
experience. Both of these elements helpfully serve

the tasks of Christian philosophy—the discerning
of the spirits of the age and the systematic clarification of those spirits and their influence on human
thought and action.
The notion of phenomenology as a promissory discipline—the discipline concerned with
the articulation and elaboration of promises—is
an attempt to find the coherence among thinkers as diverse as Husserl and Marion, Heidegger
and Dastur, and Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Francois
Courtine. Its basic claim is that phenomenology
investigates a matter (a Sache rather than a Ding)
according to what that matter says about itself, implicitly or explicitly, and what the role that matter
plays in our broader social (inter-personal) world
says about it. A phenomenology of music, for example, is interested both in what music claims
to be and to do (again, implicitly and explicitly)
and what role music plays in human living (how
it relates to other matters within and transcending
the human subject). Matters are both self-given
and externally constituted, and both of these elements must be examined if a matter is to be properly understood. In looking at what a matter says
about itself, phenomenology seeks to determine
what promise is being made within that matter by
that matter itself; in looking at the role the matter
plays in our broader social world, phenomenology
seeks to determine how well the matter is living
up to its own inherent promise. Crucial here is
that phenomenology seeks to balance what is true
of the matters themselves (so as to avoid extreme
idealism, nominalism, and relativism) and what is
contextually determined about the matters themselves (so as to avoid naïve realism, essentialism,
and absolutism). This balance is key to properly
understanding the relationship between the spirit
and the actions that are expressions of that spirit.
Part and parcel of this balance is its constant
recourse to the broader picture of the world of naïve, pre-theoretical experience—the life-world, the
world in which we live. In service of this broader
picture, phenomenology seeks to balance the analyticity necessary to understand the parts with the
synthesis necessary to relate them to the whole. As
phenomenology does both, analytic rigor is pre-

served in the service of a broader integrality that is
not merely synthetic but spiritual. This notion of
integrality is central to the heart-ed anthropology
laid out here, and I think phenomenology offers
a methodology that can respect that integrality
without losing the necessity of analytic rigor, clarification, and articulation.

As heart-ed creatures, we
cannot help but reflect some
type of spirit in all that we do,
since it is our very natures to
do so.
Much too briefly, then, I suggest that phenomenology might be key to any attempt to achieve
the discerning task of Christian philosophy. While
phenomenology may not be alone in its promissory and integral methodology, I think we would
be re-miss to ignore its literature and methodology
as we pursue further what it means to be Christian
philosophers in the 21st century.
Endnotes
1. Accessed February 2014 from http://www.calvin.edu/
academic/philosophy/virtual_library/articles/plantinga_alvin/advice_to_christian_philosophers.pdf; pp.
1-19. In text citations are to this work, unless otherwise
cited. The article was originally published in Faith and
Philosophy 1:3 (1984), 253-271.
2. This idea seems to go against Plantinga’s claims on
page 12 of “Advice to Christian Philosophers.”
3. The account presented here draws on Olthuis, “Be(com)
ing: Humankind as Gift and Call,” Philosophia
Reformata 58 (1993), 153-72.
4. Dooyeweerd enumerates them as the mathematical,
spatial, kinematic, physical, biological, sensitive, logical, historical (formative), lingual, social, economic,
aesthetic, judicial, ethical, and the pistic (faith).
5. Or that a similar spirit is being animated differently,
but pursuing this topic would take us too far afield for
our purposes here.
6. See, for example, Husserl’s Crisis of the European
Sciences.
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